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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE "TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE"
AN UNOWNED-OWNED VEHICLE
I. INTRODUCTION
It is probably safe to say that every automobile insurance policy
which is being written today includes a definition of a temporary substi-
tute automobile. The present phrasing of the clause came into existence
with the writing of family type automobile policies which began to
appear about 1956.1 Although the definition will vary somewhat from
policy to policy, a typical provision states:
"Temporary Substitute Automobile" means any automobile or
trailer, not owned by the named insured, while temporarily used
with the permission of the owner as a substitute for the owned
automobile or trailer when withdrawn from normal use because
of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. 2
The reason the language is included in the policy, stated in a positive
way, is
to extend coverage temporarily and automatically, without
the payment of an additional premium, to the insured to protect
him when he uses an autombile not specified in the policy in
place of the specified vehicle he intended normally to use but did
not because of its withdrawal from use for a reason stated in
the policy.3
More often the courts prefer to comment on the definition in a negative
sense: ". . . it indicates a purpose to avoid covering more than one
automobile for a single premium."'
The real question, of course, is not what the insurance company in-
tended to do when they included the clause, but what, in fact, they
have accomplished. This paper will first determine when a vehicle quali-
fies as a "temporary substitute automobile" and then discuss the nature
and extent of the insurance coverage thereunder. -
II. WHEN IS A VEHICLE A TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE?
There is no single "temporary substitute" test that can be applied
in every fact situation. "All cases on the subject of 'substitute automo-
bile' sustain the doctrine fully that each case is determined by its own
peculiar circumstances."' Therefore, the application of a given policy
definition to a particular automobile at a definite time will ordinarily
involve only questions of fact. A clause by clause analysis of the given
1 See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Banks, 152 So. 2d 666 (Ala. 1963).
2 See RisjoRD & AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES-STANDARD
PROVISIONS 186 (1964).
3 Lewis v. Bradley, 7 Wis. 2d 586, 97 N.W.2d 408 (1959) ; see also Harte v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 123 Vt. 120, 183 A.2d 223 (1962).
4Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Wendler, 84 Idaho 114, 368 P.2d 933 (1962) ; see also
Musso v. Am. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 14 Misc.2d 450, 178 N.Y.S.2d
377 (1958).
' Central Nat. Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Sisneros, 173 F. Supp. 757 (D. N.M. 1959).
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policy definition will be of great help in resolving the questions which
do arise.
A. Not Covered by the Named Insured
For the time being, it is necessary to assume that the "named in-
sured" refers only to the person named in the declarations. 6 The gen-
eral rule in this area is that the specified insured shall not actually own,
in whole or in part, the automobile which he seeks to qualify as a
temporary substitute.
In Midden v.. Allstate Insurance Company7 an- auto was owned by
the insured husband and his wife. Although the vehicle was ordinarily
used only by the wife, who carried her own insurance on the car, it
could not qualify as a temporary substitute for the husband because he
owned it.s
Government Employees Insurance Company v. Thomas9 provided
a slightly different situation. The insured made a verbal agreement to
sell his second, uninsured car to a friend. The insured later repossessed
this second car because his friend failed to make the purchase payments.
Then the insured's first car became disabled. The second auto did not
become a temporary substitute automobile for the insured because he
still owned it.
The rule was pushed to the limit in Fleckenstein v. Citizen's Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company"0 where the insured assigned a certifi-
cate of title to the car in question to his son. The son did not obtain
a new certificate of title, but title was held to have passed notwithstand-
ing the noncompliance with state law. The auto became a temporary
substitute for the father who borrowed it back and had an accident.1'
In all these cases the courts have been quite insistent on finding
actual ownership before denying coverage. This very element was miss-
ing in St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company v. Heflin.'2 A car titled
to a partnership was used by an insured partner while his personal car
was undergoing repairs. The court found that the vehicle qualified as a
substitute auto because it was not owned by the insured but "was
6 But see the text connected with footnotes 44 - 53 of this article for a complete
discussion of the "named insured" problem. For purposes of clarity, this
paper will refer to the insured named in the declarations as the "specified
insured."
7 7 Ill. App. 2d 499, 129 N.E.2d 779 (1955).
8 It is important to recognize that the coverage under the temporary substitute
clause is always excess. The question of coverage on the husband's policy
does not even come into play here until the wife's primary coverage (if. it
applies in the given fact situation) is exhausted. The nature and extent of
the insurance coverage under the temporary substitute clause is covered in
the text connected with footnotes 54- 57 of this article.
9 357 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1962) ; see also Luckett v. Cowser, 39 Wis. 2d 224, 159
N.W.2d 94 (1968). In all these cases the reader must assume that an accident
occurs while the insured is driving the car in question.
10 326 Mich. 59, 40 N.W.2d 733 (1950).
"I But see Kahn v. Lockhart, 392 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. App. 1965).
12 137 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
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actually purchased and owned by the partnership." Although partner-
ship assets ultimately belong to the partners, this is not the actual
ownership which disqualifies an auto from becoming a temporary sub-
stitute.
1 3
B. While Temporarily Used
The words "while temporarily used" imply, it would seem, a rela-
tively short period. No doubt the phrase was originally included in the
temporary substitute automobile definition to deny substitute coverage
to a vehicle which the insured regularly used or which the insured
regularly had at his disposal. If that was the idea which the drafters
of the insurance contract had in mind, their choice of wording was
unfortunate."
Actually, there is no time limit on temporary use. The passage that
formed the basis for the interpretation of these words is Mcilanus v.
Home Insurance Company."5 In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court interpreting "temporary" as it was used in a fire insurance policy,
said: "The word 'temporary' has no fixed meaning in the sense that it
designates any fixed period of time. It is a word used in contradistinc-
tion to permanent.... If not permanent, it must have been temporary."
The McManus definition was cited with approval in Fleckenistein
v. Citizen's Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,16 one of the lead-
ing cases which construed a "temporary substitute automobile" clause.
In that case the court affirmed a jury determination that the use of a
substitute automobile for a six-month period was a temporary use. 17
Even where the ownership of an insured vehicle has been terminated
by selling it to a junkyard, a subsequent use of other non-owned vehicles
13 A slightly different fact situation brought about the same result in Farley v.
American Auto. Ins. Co., 137 W. Va. 455, 72 S.E.2d 520 (1952). The insured
business vehicle was covered by a policy issued to partners A and B. The
vehicle was withdrawn from normal use and a truck owned by partner A was
loaned to partner B for use in the partnership business. The vehicle became
a temporary substitute automobile for the withdrawn vehicle because the
substituted truck was not owned by the named insured (the named insured
being partners A and B).
14 The definition of "non-owned automobile" also includes language which pro-
hibits use over an extended period of time. RISJORD & AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES-STANDARD PROVISIONS 186 (1964), set out the
usual "non-owned automobile" definition: ". . . an automobile or trailer not
owned by or furnished for the regular use of .. " An extended discussion
of the "non-owned" provision is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
the courts have quite literally applied the "not ... furnished for the regular
use of" provision. Le Mense v. Thiel, 25 Wis. 2d 364, 130 N.W.2d 875 (1964).
But see Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 56 Cal. App. 2d 597, 132 P.2d 846(1943). Contrast the application of that language to the "temporarily used"
language of the definition under question in this article.
15 201 Wis. 164, 229 N.W. 537, 538 (1930).
16 Fleckenstein v. Citizen's Mut. Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 59, 40 N.W.2d 733 (1950).
17 See Little v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 1962); De Marco
v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 153 So. 2d 594 (La. App. 1963); McKee v.
Exch. Ins. Ass'n, 270 Ala. 518, 120 So. 2d 690 (1960).
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qualifies them as temporary substitute automobiles.' 8 The cases in this
area indicate a desire to provide protection over the life of the policy
even though the insured automobile doesn't last that long.' 9 Since a
policy is ordinarily written for a year's duration, any period of time
up to that length could easily be determined as temporary. 20
C. With the Permission of the Owner
This clause, absent in the 1958 Standard Family Automobile Liability
Policy, was included in the next draft, in 1963.21 The later draft should
put an end to decisions like Densmore v. Hartford Accident & Indem-
nity Company2 where the court found that an auto stolen by an insured
after his vehicle became disabled qualified as a temporary substitute
automobile.
Even prior to the change, some courts insisted that the permission
of the owner was necessary.23
Once the specified insured has obtained the owner's permission to
use the substitute vehicle, it appears that, under the proper circum-
stances, either the owner of the vehicle or the specified insured can give
permission to other persons to use the borrowed car.24 There are many
Is See Freeport Motor Cas. Co. v. Tharp, 338 Ill. App. 593, 88 N.E.2d 499 (1949);
McKee v. Exch. Ins. Ass'n, 270 Ala. 518, 120 So. 2d 690 (1960).
19 In Freeport Motor Cas. Co. v. Tharp, 338 Ill. App. 593, 88 N.E.2d 499 (1949),
the court declared: "The policy was to cover a one-year term and was de-
signed to cover the insured during that period of time, even if his automobile
was withdrawn from normal use by reason of breakdown. It must be conceded
. . that the automobile which the insured sold for junk was withdrawn from
normal use by reason of the breakdown .... To conclude that the insured was
required to retain ownership of the automobile described in the policy before
there would be any protection to the insured under its terms, we feel is not
justified under the facts and the law."
20The case of Munson v. Speck, 76 S.D. 599, 83 N.W.2d 479 (1957), seems to
indicate that once an insured car is abandoned, no other automobile could
qualify as a temporary substitute under that policy. The case can be factually
distinguished from Freeport Motor Cas. Co. v. Tharp, 338 Ill. App. 593, 88
N.E.2d 499 (1949). In Munson the insured auto had a flat tire. The specified
insured decided he didn't want it any more and notified the used car dealer
who still held the title as security under a conditional sales contract. Before
the specified insured was involved in an accident in the borrowed car, the
flat tire on the insured auto had been fixed and the insured auto was being
driven again. Therefore at the time of the loss in question the insured auto
was not "withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, serv-
icing, loss or destruction." However, when, as in Freeport, the vehicle is
junked, even though any ultimate ownership rights in the auto have termi-
nated, the auto still fits the language of the policy.
21 Compare RIsjoRD & AUsTiN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES-
STANDARD PROVISIONS 58 (1964) (Text of 1958 Standard Provisions) with
186 (Text of 1963 Standard Provisions).
22 221 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. Pa. 1963).2 3 See Davidson v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. 4. App. Div.2d 759, 165 N.Y.S2d
598 (1957).
24 This is a relatively general statement which must be further clarified to put
it in its proper perspective. When the specified insured is driving the alleged
temporary substitute automobile, the only "permission" question is whether
he has the permission of the owner of the substitute vehicle.
The real permission problems arise when an additional insured suffers an
accident. The additional insured becomes involved in a temporary substitute
automobile problem in two basic ways. First, he uses the specified insured's
19681
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complicated fact situations which arise in conjunction with this "second"
permission, but these problems are better put off until after an extended
discussion of "named insured" later in this paper. At this point it is
sufficient to say that the "owner's permission" requirement is quite clear
on its face, and the courts insist on finding at least this initial permission
before ruling that a borrowed vehicle is a temporary substitute.
D. As a Substitute for the Owned Automobile
"Owned automobile" in this sense is construed to be the vehicle
specified in the declarations. The courts will not look to the definition
of "owned automobile" within the policy because the definition includes
a temporary substitute automobile.25 Thus if "owned auto" was interp-
reted any other way than "the specified auto," this particular part of
the "temporary substitute automobile" definition would be nonsense.
The important word in this phrase, therefore, is substitute. "It has
been said that the word 'substituted' describes a replacement of one
thing by another . . . and [it] implies the removal or elimination of the
thing replaced .... 26
Substitution can be proven only by showing that, except for the
breakdown, "the insured car would have been in use at the time and
in tre circumstances involved. '27
By way of example, the Norman Concrete Works owned a 1941
Ford which was used on a highway construction job. The evidence
auto with permission, but the vehicle does not operate properly. Therefore
the additional insured borrows another automobile to continue the trip. This
borrowed automobile will constitute a temporary substitute under the speci-
fied insured's policy if there was express or implied permission to the addi-
tional insured to make the substitution. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Grundeen, 138 F. Supp. 498 (D. N.D. 19 ), aff'd.'238 F.2d 750 (8th
Cir. 1956). If the additional insured is a resident of the same household as
the specified insured, the permission is not even required. See Davidson v.
Fireman's Fund Ind. Co., 4 A.D.2d 759, 165 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1957), and the
comment to that case in 2 RISJORD & AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE CASES 1554-5 (1965). Of course, in situations like this, the permission
of the owner of the borrowed vehicle to the additional insured is indispensable.
The second way an additional insured can be involved in a temporary sub-
stitute automobile problem is by borrowing a car from the specified insured
which has already become a temporary substitute for that party. In these
situations coverage is determined as if the temporary substitute was actually
the owned automobile of the specified insured. The specified insured neces-
sarily must have had the permission of the owner to have borrowed the car
originally. The additional insured will ordinarily need the permission of the
specified insured to use the car, but this permission is not necessary when the
additional insured is a resident of the same household. Harte v. Peerless In-
surance Co., 123 Vt. 106, 183 A.2d 223 (1962).
25 See RiSJORD & AUSTIN note 2 supra at 185-6.
"'... owned automobile' means(a) a private passenger, farm or utility automobile described in this
policy for which a specific premium charge indicates that cover-
age is afforded,(b) a trailer owned by the named insured,
(d) ... a temporary substitute automobile ..
2683 C.J.S. Substitute § 766 (1953), cited with approval in Fullilove v. United
States Cas. Co. of N.Y., 240 La. 859, 125 So. 2d 389 (1961).
27Little v. Safeguard Insurance Co., 137 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 1962). Accord,
Bivins v. Ace Wrecking & Excavating Co., 409 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1966).
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tended to show, that, because of the vehicle's deteriorated condition, it
was never used on the highway. One of the partners was using his own
Oldsmobile during working hours and was involved in a: collision on
the highway. He pointed out that the 1941 Ford was in for repairs, that
he otherwise would have used it for the trip in question, and that he
therefore qualified under the temporary substitute automobile clause of
the Ford's insurance policy. The court said: "we consider controlling
the absence of any evidence which can be said to establish that the
Oldsmobile was, for tre trip in question, used as a substitute for the
Ford. . . . [T]he breakdown of the Ford was only coincidental.1 28
Since the Ford was never used on the highway, the use of the Oldsmo-
bile on the highway foreclosed its qualifying as a substitute.
E. When Withdrawn From Normal Use
Under this phrase, the law is far from settled. The majority posi-
tion is that before a vehicle can qualify as a temporary substitute auto-
mobile, the vehicle specified in the 'declarations must be withdrawn from
all normal use. The minority contends that an insured can substitute
another vehicle if the auto named in the declarations is disabled from
performing its principal, or nomal, use.
Service Mutual Insurance Company v. Chambers2 9 provides a good
illustration of the majority position. The insured truck was ordinarily
used for house moving. On the day in question, however, the winch of
the insured truck was broken, so the insured rented another truck. The
rented truck did not qualify as a temporary substitute under the policy
because the insured truck was still being used for some purpose. In
fact, the insured truck was being driven in front of the rented truck to
provide directions. Had the rented truck qualified as a substitute, the
insurer would have been covering two trucks for the price of one pre-
mium.
30
The leading case for the minority position is Allstate Insurance Com-
pany v. Roberts.3' The insured's car had a faulty ignition system which
caused it to kill at highway speeds, although it did operate properly at
low speeds. The insured decided to take a friend home who lived in a
nearby town and he borrowed a car for this purpose. The insured left
his car keys with his wife so she would have transportation. The court
held that the limited withdrawal of the insured car because of its dis-
repair was sufficient to make the borrowed car a temporary substitute
automobile.3
2
28 Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Norman, 197 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1952).
29 289 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1956).
30 See also Erickson v. Genisot, 322 Mich. 303, 33 N.W.2d 803 (1948), where
the borrowed auto was more comfortable, in better working condition, and
more appropriate to the particular use. The borrowed auto was not a temp-
orary substitute because the insured auto was still being driven.
3' 156 Cal. App. 2d 755, 320 P.2d 90 (1958).
32 It is interesting to note that in most ases under the majority position, the
exposure of the insurance companies has been actual. That is, both the in-
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A concise statement of the minority position appeared in Mid-
Continent Casualty Company v. West. 3 The court said: "Under the
reasonable and liberal interpretation that must be given the 'temporary
substitute automobile' provision, its wording does not mean that the
• . . 'described automobile' must be disabled from all use.
F. Because of Its Breakdown, Repair, Servicing, Loss or Destruction
This particular part of the definition is almost inseparable from the
"withdrawn from normal use" section. Consequently, the impact of the
majority and minority views is felt in this area too. In those states that
require a vehicle to be withdrawn from all normal use, a greater degree
of breakdown, etc., is required before a substitute vehicle will be covered.
Under the minority position where an insured vehicle need only be
withdrawn from some normal use, a lesser degree of breaktown will be
sufficient justification to borrow another car.
Under either standard, however, there must be a more concrete
reason for not using the specified vehicle than the fact that it was not
as suitable as another available car. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Company v. Western Fire Insurance Company35 the insured preferred
to use an older truck rather than his insured auto to travel over rough
roads. The truck did not constitute a temporary substitute auto. Like-
wise, where the insured borrowed a car because his was low on gas
and had chains on the tires which were not necessary, the borrowed car
did not qualify as a substitute. 36
In a state which adopted the minority view, worn tires on the
insured vehicle were sufficient to qualify the borrowed auto as a tem-
porary substitute.37 Under the majority rule, worn tires did not consti-
tute a breakdown.3 8
In any jurisdiction, when a vehicle is necessarily withdrawn for
any of the enumerated reasons, coverage is obtained. In Brown v. Secur-
ity Fire & Indemnity Company39 the insured auto had a fiat tire. The
truck that was borrowed to take the tire to be fixed was a temporary
substitute automobile.
sured vehicle and the borrowed vehicle were being driven at the same time.
Conversely, where the courts favor the minority rule, both cars were not
being driven at the time of the accident. It appears to this writer that the
differing equities of the fact situations should not control the outcome. Even
where, as in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 156 Cal. App. 2d 755, 320 P.2d
90 (1958), there was no actual double exposure (since the wife did not
actually drive the insured car at the same time that her husband was using
the borrowed car), nonetheless the potential exposure was there, and the
insurance company should not be required to bear this uncompensated burden.
33351 P.2d 398, 400 (Okla. 1959).34 See also Canal Ins. Co. v. Paul, 51 Tenn. App. 446, 369 S.W.2d 393 (1962).
35 196 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Ky.) 1961).
36 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Addy, 132 Colo. 202, 286 P.2d 622 (1955).
3 Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. West, 351 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1959).
38 Fullilove v. United States Cas. Co., 240 La. 859, 125 So. 2d 389 (1960). It is
interesting to note that in this case, too, the insured's wife actually drove the
vehicle while her husband was using the borrowed car. See note 32 supra.
3 244 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. Va. 1965).
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In a closer decision, the insured vehicle was in the possession of a
sign painter to have the name of a business painted thereon. The de-
scribed vehicle was deemed withdrawn because of "servicing" and the
borrowed vehicle became a temporary substitute.40
However, even where the vehicle is actually withdrawn, if the
reason is not one of those specified in the policy, there will be no cover-
age. For example, in Lincombe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insu-
rance Company41 the insured traded in his insured auto but could not
get immediate delivery on his new automobile. The dealer lent the in-
sured a car but it did not qualify as a temporary substitute.
In another situation, the buyer defaulted in car payments on a
conditional sales contract and his insured auto was repossessed. A




When an insured is involved in an accident and he is driving a
different car than the one specified in his policy declarations, he is only
going to get coverage under the "temporary substitute" or "non-owned"
provisions of his policy. The coverage is broader under the substitute
provision.43 An attempt should always be made to qualify under that
section first. In addition, some automobiles that would not qualify as
"non-owned," because they are provided for the regular use of the
named insured or any relative, will still qualify as temporary substitutes.
The only way to determine whether the automobile qualifies as a
substitute is to analyze the policy definition clause by clause. There will
be very few policies, if any, which use more language than that which
has been analyzed in this paper.
The first item to question is who actually owns the borrowed car.
If the insured has any actual ownership, the auto simply has no chance
of qualifying as a temporary substitute. If the insured is not the owner,
the next thing to check is whether the insured had permission to use
40 Sanz v. Reserve Ins. Co., 172 So. 2d 912 (Fla. App. 1965).
42 166 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 1964).42 Travelers Indem. Co. v. American Casualty Co., 226 F. Supp. 354 (S.D. W. Va.
1964). In considering the cases that deny coverage under the temporary sub-
stitute automobile cases. the reader should not lose sight of the entire coverage
picture. The standard automobile insurance policy ordinarily provides coverage
for the named insured when he is driving a "non-owned" automobile. How-
ever, fewer additional insureds are covered under the "non-owned" provision
than are covered under the "temporary substitute" provision. Therefore in-
sureds often try to qualify under the latter definition. Moreover, there is no
coverage under the "non-owned" provision when the non-owned vehicle is
furnished for the regular use of the insured. See Moutry v. American Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 35 Wis. 2d 652, 151 N.W.2d 630 (1967). If a temporary sub-
stitute auto meets all the other requirements which were previously set out,
the fact that it is regularly used does not defeat coverage. What the overall
picture really boils down to is that the insurance company is -willing to provide
coverage in these areas as long as the exposure is limited to one car per
premium.
4 Note 42 supra.
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the substitute vehicle. Once such permission is established, it is important
to find out (1) what was wrong with the insured car, (2) where it was
at the time of the eventual accident, and (3) why it was not being
used. Where the auto was fully disabled for a reason specified in the
policy, the borrowed auto will qualify as a temporary substitute without
question. Where the "disabled" auto was actually being used by someone
at the time the insured had the accident in the borrowed car, it is going
to be extremely difficult to qualify the borrowed vehicle as a temporary
substitute. Where the "disabled" auto was capable of, being used for
some purpose, but it was not actually being driven when the insured had
the accident in a borrowed car, the courts differ on the coverage ques-
tion. Although it would seem that the courts should not provide "tem-
porary substitute" coverage in this situation, but should, rather, look
for coverage under the "non-owned" section of the policy, some courts
have determined that limited withdriwal and limited disability is a
sufficient basis for temporary substitute automobile status.
The last point to check is whether the insured car would have been
used had it not been withdrawn. When the insured auto is only coinci-
dentally being repaired, there is no temporary substitute coverage. As
previously pointed out, the length of time the borrowed auto is used will
not defeat coverage if all the other conditions are satisfied.
III. THE DUAL PROBLEM OF THE "NAMED INSURED"
The words "named insured" are strewn throughout the Standard
Family Automobile Liability Policy." In connection with the temporary
substitute automobile those two words have caused considerable confu-
sion. Conceivably there should be no problem because the words are
defined in the policy: "'named insured' means the individual named
in item 1 of the declarations and also includes his spouse, if a resident
of the same household ;"45 The ultimate root of the problem is that the
policy definition of "named insured" applies in some instances and not
in others.
Assuming that the substitute vehicle meets the policy definition for
a temporary substitute automobile, it is important to determine who is
insured under the policy. This determination is quite simple to make.
By definition the "owned automobile" includes a temporary substitute
automobile. Therefore once a vehicle qualifies as a temporary substitute,
it becomes, for all purposes, the vehicle named in the declarations. Any
further interpretation of the policy should proceed as if the temporary
auto was actually the owned automobile.
In determining which persons are insured while driving a temporary
substitute, we need only to look at the policy statement of "persons in-
sured with respect to the owned automobile." That definition is set out
44 See RISJORD & AUSnN, note 2 supra.
45 Id. at 185.
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below.4 1 The most striking part of that definition, of course, is the now
famous omnibus clause.47 That clause has been the source of much dis-
cussion which is not pertinent to the topic being analyzed here. It is
important, however, to note that when the words "named insured" are
used within the "persons insured" definition, the policy definition of
"named insured' applies.
Therefore, once a vehicle is qualified as a temporary substitute auto-
mobile, the analysis of the terms "persons insured" and "named insured"
proceeds exactly as if the automobile named in the declarations was be-
ing driven instead of a borrowed car. The substitute car really becomes
the owned-automobile.
However, in attempting to qualify a vehicle as a temporary substi-
tute automobile, the words "named insured" appear again. "'Temporary
Substitute Automobile' means any automobile or trailer, not owned by
the named insured .... -48
In this context, "named insured" is interpreted t6 be the insured
named in the declarations. The policy definition of "named insured"
does not apply here.
The end result of this construction is that an automobile owned by
a specified insured's spouse can be a temporary substitute automobile
for the other marriage partner. In Caldwell ij. Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Company4 9 the insured's wife owned an automobile in her
own name. The insured's car had a flat tire and he borrowed his wife's
car. That car qualified as a temporary substitute. The court held that
a wife's car is not owned by the named insured even though the policy
definition of named insured includes the wife.50 '
40 The definition of "persons insured with respect to the owned automobile" is
found in RisjoR & AusTiN, note 2 supra at 184:
"Persons Insured
The following are insureds under Part 1:
(a) With respect to the owned automobile, 1) the named insured and
any resident of the same household,
(2) any other person using such automobile with the permission of the
named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating)
his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission, and(3) any other person or organization but only with respect to his or its
liability because of acts or omissions of an insured under (a) (1) or (2)
above...."
Under Wis. STAT. § 204.30 (3) (1965), section (a) (2) of the "Persons
Insured" definition is amended to read:
"(2) any other person using such automobile with the permission of the
named insured or an adult member of his household other than a chauffeur
or domestic servant, provided his actual operation or (if he is not oper-
ating) his other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission,
and ...."
47 See note 46 supra Wis. STAT. § 204.30 (3) (a) (2) (1965). An extended analy-
sis of the omnibus clause can be found in Annot, 4 A.L.R.3rd 10 (1965).
4s RIsjoRD & AusTi, note 2 supra.
49 248 Miss. 767, 160 So. 2d 209 (1964).50 Accord, where the substituted car was owned solely by the wife, Baxley v
State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 332, 128 S.E.2d 165 (1962).
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Cases that appear to b on all fours with Caldwell, but which have
opposing results, can be factually distinguished on the basis of actual
ownership.
The insured in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Wendler5 ' borrowed
his wife's car as a substitute when his was disabled. The policy in that
case defined "named insured" as including the wife. The title to the
borrowed car was in the wife's name but the Idaho Supreme Court
held that the borrowed car was owned by the named insured. However,
it is important to remember that Idaho is a community property state.
Because the car was purchased with community funds, the husband was
considered the actual owner of the car along with the wife.
In Casano v. Cook 52 the insured bought a second car for his wife.
The car was registered in both names but the wife took out a separate
insurance policy for "her"' car. When the husband borrowed her car
(his was disabled), it was held not to be a temporary substitute auto-
mobile because the second car was registered in his name and he was a
part actual owner.
Therefore, in analyzing a "named insured" problem under a tempor-
ary substitute automobile situation, there is really a two-step process.
First, see if the substituted automobile was actually owned in whole or
in part by the insured named in the declarations. If it was, the auto will
not qualify as a temporary substitute. Second, if the auto was not so
owned, see if the driver qualifies as a "named insured" as the term is
defined in the policy. 53 Any further problems that arise with the "named
insured" provision relate to that definition and are beyond the scope
of this paper. However, it is important to remember that from this point
on, the substitute automobile has become an "owned automobile" for all
policy interpretation purposes.
IV. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INSURANCE COVERAGE
If a vehicle qualifies as a temporary substitute automobile, the cover-
age is specifically declared in the policy to be excess coverage.5 4 There-
fore when other insurance primarily covers the insured, the insurance
covering the vehicle as a temporary substitute would apply on top of the
other primary insurance.
For example, a student is working as a delivery boy for a flower
51368 P.2d 933 (Idaho 1962).
52 157 So. 2d 616 (La. App. 1963).
53 In analyzing a "named insured" definition in an insurance policy, the reader
can expect to encounter difficulties in determining when a person is a resident
and what constitutes a household. Moreover "named insured" problems go
hand-in-hand with scope of permission inquiries under the omnibus clause.
It may be some help to consult Gouldin, Who is the Insured?, 31 N.Y. Bar
Bull. 365 (1965).
54 See RiSJORD & AuSTIN, note 2 supra at 191 and 194-199. The insurance coverage
under Part I-Liability, Part II-Expenses for Medical Services, and Part
III-Physical Damage is stated as follows: ". . . the insurance with respect to
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shop. Prior to leaving on a particularly rush delivery, he discovers that
the delivery truck has a flat tire. The owner of the flower shop requests
the student to use his own car for the particular delivery, and the stu-
dent is involved in an accident. A judgment is subsequently entered
against the student and the flower shop in excess of the student's
$10,000 limits. In such a situation, the student's insurance is primary
and it is applied up to the $10,000 limit. Thereafter, and up to its limits,
the insurance on the flower shop delivery van comes into focus because
the student's car was a temporary substitute55 for the delivery van.
Until very recently, there was a question whether the owner of the
substitute vehicle could be covered as an additional insured under the
substitution provision of another's policy. This was the exact situation
set out in the hypothetical above. The student was the actual owner of
the substitute vehicle, but the vehicle qualified as a temporary substitute
under the flower shop's insurance policy. In Lumbermen's Mutual
Casualty Company56 the defending insurance company claimed there
was no coverage under that type of fact situation. There a father's car
was insured, but it was broken down and withdrawn from all use. The
father asked his son to run an errand in the son's car. A collision fol-
lowed and the son claimed excess coverage under his father's insurance
policy. The Court of Appeals decided in the son's favor.
An incredible variety of fact situations can develop when two or
more insurance policies cover an automobile involved in a collision.
Every policy has some type of "other insurance" clause wherein they
try to limit their primary and excess coverage. Some recent articles do
a particularly thorough job of analyzing these various problems.5 7 The
difficult problems arise when two or more companies have excess ex-
posure and each of them declares that their insurance only applies after
"all other valid and collectible insurance." Further discussion of this
topic goes beyond the scope of this paper, but the cited articles will
provide a thorough briefing of the problems involved.
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a temporary substitute automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess
insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance."
55 Recall the analysis set for at the end of part one of this article which will
determine whether the borrowed vehicle qualifies as a temporary substitute.
The vehicle is not owned by the 'name insured" (specified insured) because
the flower shop's insurance policy is involved. The student is the actual owner
of the vehicle in question. The flower shop had the permission of the vehicle's
owner to use the vehicle. The specified evhicle was actually withdrawn for a
reason specified in the policy, and the specified vehicle would have been
used for the delivery in question except for the breakdown. The substitution
was only temporary.
56 367 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1966).
5' See Nole, Concurrent Coverage in Autonobile Liability Insurance, 65 Colo.
L. Rev. 319 (1965), and Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-Multiple Coverage,
40 Denver L. 3. 259 (1963). See also Lencombe v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 1964).
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